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THE FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND'S THEORY::
DAVID M. LEVITAN'
"The charm of guessing ancient motives from the records of an-
cient deeds fascinated me-there is much in the pursuit to appeal
to a gambler .
D. G. HOGAITH
Accidents of an Antiquary's Life.
THE United States has now joined the other nations of the world in
a broad program of international cooperation. Since this country is
governed under a ritten constitution, as interpreted by the courts,
examination of the scope of authority of the national government in
the field of foreign affairs is appropriate. Questions of constitutional
competence have already been raised. ' The most recent authoritative
and complete exposition of the legal scope of the foreign relations power
is to be found in Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion in the case of United
States v. C ,rtiss-Wright Export Corporation.2 The Curliss-Wriglit de-
cision was wholly relied on by Mr. Justice Sutherland in his opinion in
the case of United States v. Belmont 3 and by Mir. Justice Douglas in
United States v. Pi?zk.4 It constitutes for the present the official legal
view on the external powers of the federal government, and is, there-
fore, worthy of careful analysis. The analysis of the legal meaning of
the opinion in turn suggests an examination of the origin and validity
of the theory on which Mr. Justice Sutherland rests his decision-the
rationale of the opinion.
An analysis of the decision requires that some attention be given to
its significance and merits as a legal pronouncement: What is the prac-
* This article is part of a study on Rccen Deeelopments in the Control of FcrCfdr, Affairs,
the completion of which has been delayed by the war. The author is indebted to Profezor
K. N. Llewellyn for critical comments.
t Department of State (on leave). Holder of Post-Doctoral Demobilization Avard,
Social Science Research Council.
1. See the debates on ratification of UNO charter, re authority of Precident and/or
the United States delegates to the Security Council to commit the use of American troops
under article 43. 91 Cong. Rec., July 23-23, 1945, at 8083-3129 esp. 3121, 3156-63.
2. 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
3. 301 U. S. 324 (1937).
4. 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
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tical effect of the decision? Is it consistent with established interpreta-
tion and does it conform to the accepted political philosophy of the
state? Of course such an inquiry does not challenge the effectiveness
of the decision as existing law. There is no review of a decision of the
Supreme Court save by that court itself.
The primary object of this study is to demonstrate the evolution of
an opinion and the Court's manner of resort to rationalia in support
of its interpretations.
THE THEORY
The Curtiss-Wright case arose out of the President's Embargo Proc-
lamation, May 28, 1934.1 Earlier on the same day, Congress had passed
a joint resolution,6 which provided:
That if the President finds that the prohibition of the sale of arms
and munitions of war in the United States to those countries now
engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco may contribute to the re-
establishment of peace between those countries, and if after con-
sultation with the governments of other American Republics and
with their cooperation, as well as that of such other governments as
he may deem necessary, he makes proclamation to that effect, it
shall be unlawful to sell, except under such limitations, and excep-
tions as the President prescribes, any arms or munitions of war in
any place in the United States to the countries now engaged in that
armed conflict, or to any person, company, or association acting in
the interest of either country, until otherwise ordered by the Presi-
dent or by Congress.
In pursuance of this authority the President issued an embargo
proclamation prohibiting the sale of arms and munitions of war in the
United States to Bolivia and Paraguay. This proclamation was re-
voked on November 14, 1935.7 The defendants were indicted in 1936
for conspiring to sell arms to Bolivia.
The main issue before the Supreme Court was: Did this constitute
an unconstitutional delegation of authority? Mr. Justice Sutherland,
speaking for an all but unanimous court (Justice McReynolds dissent-
ing; Justice Stone not participating) upheld the validity of the joint
resolution and the President's proclamation in pursuance thereof.
In its opinion the Court had to differentiate the National Industrial
Recovery Act cases in which wide delegation of power had been held
unconstitutional. The most satisfactory distinction according to Mr.
Justice Sutherlarid was that the NIRA cases related to internal powers
of the government, and the Curtiss-Wright case to external powers.
This presented the opportunity for an exposition of the nature and
5. 48 STAT. 1744 (1934).
6. 48 STAT. 811 (1934).
7. 49 STAT. 3480 (1935).
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origin of these two sets of powers. To this task the Justice lent his great
ability and learning.
"The two classes of powers are different both in respect of their
origin and their nature. The broad statement that the federal gov-
ernment can exercise no powers except those specificially enumer-
ated in the constitution, and such implied powers-as are necessary
and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categori-
cally true only in respect of our internal affairs. In that field the
primary purpose of the Constitution was to carve from the general
mass of legislative powers then possessed by the states such portions
as were thought desirable to vest in the federal government, leaving
those not included in the enumeration still in the states. . . .That
this doctrine applies only to powers which the states had, is self
evident. And since the states severally never possessed interna-
tional powers, such powers could not have been carved from the
mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United
States from some other source. During the colonial period those
powers were possessed exclusively by and were entirely under the
control of the Crown. By the Declaration of Independence 'the
Representatives of the United States of America' declared the
United (not the several) colonies to be free and independent states,
and as such to have 'full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, con-
tract Alliances, establish Commerce and do all other Acts and
Things which Independent States may of right do.'
"As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies
acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the
Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their col-
lective and corporate capacity as the United States of America.
Even before the Declaration, the colonies were a unit in foreign
affairs, acting through a common agency-namely the Continental
Congress, composed of delegates from the thirteen colonies. That
agency exercised the powers of war and peace, raised an army,
created a navy, and finally adopted the Declaration of Independ-
ence. Rulers come and go; governments and forms of governments
change; but sovereignty survives. A political society cannot endure
without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in
suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty of Great Brit-
ain in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the
Union....
"The Union existed even before the Constitution, which was
ordained and established among other things to form 'a more per-
fect Union.' Prior to that event, it is clear that the Union, declared
by the Articles of Confederation to be 'perpetual' was the sole pos-
sessor of external sovereignty and in the Union it remained without
change save in or so far as the Constitution in express terms quali-
fied its exercise. [Citing Story, Commentaries on the Constitution,8
for confirmation of these views.] . ..
8. 1 SToRY, Com~nwr.Nuxms oN THE CoxsTrruox (4th ed. 1873) 193-217.
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"It results that the investment of the federal government with
the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirma-
tive grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage
war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic re-
lations with other sovereignties if they had never been mentioned
in the Constitution, would have been vested in the federal govern-
ment as necessary concomitants of nationality ...
"Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external
affairs in origin and essential character different from that over in-
ternal affairs, but participation in the exercise of power is signifi-
cantly limited. In this vast external realm with its important, com-
plicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation ...
"It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of
legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations-a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of congress,
but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Con-
stitution." 
9
Not long after the Curtiss-Wright case the Court again had an oppor-
tunity in United States v. Belmont to discuss the scope of the foreign
relations power, and especially the role of the President in the exercise
of that power. The case arose as a result of the Litvinoff Assignment-
an Executive Agreement entered into by President Roosevelt and
Mr. Litvinoff-at the time of our recognition of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. 0 The immediate question before the Court was
the validity of the USSR's assignment to the United States of assets
located in the United States but which originally belonged to Russian
corporations nationalized by the Russian government. The underlying
constitutional issue raised by the case was the status and validity of
the Executive Agreement." Did the agreement occupy as exalted a
9. 299 U. S. 304, 315-20 (1936).
10. Documents printed in (Supp. 1934) 28 Am. J. INT. L. 1-15. On the recognition
cases, see CowLEs, TREATIES AND CONSrITUTONAL LAW (1941) c. XIV; Dickinson, Rec.
ognition Cases, 1925-1930 (1931) 25 AM. J. INT. L. 214; Nebolsine, The Recovery of the For-
eign Assets of Nationalized Russian Corporation (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 1130; Borchard, The
Unrecognized Government in American Courts (1932) 26 Amr. J. INT. L. 261; JAFFE, JUDICIAL
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1933).
11. For other aspects of this case, see Jessup, The Livinov Assignment and the Belmont
Case (1937) 31 Am. 3. INT. L. 481. For a discussion of the de facto and de jure issues, see
Borchard, supra note 10; Baty, So-Called "De Facto" Recognition (1921) 31 YALE L. J. 469;
BIGGs, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1938) c. II, esp. 66-7, 77-9 and materials there cited.
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position as a treaty? Could an Executive Agreement override the
public policy of a state? 12
With the Curtiss-TVright decision already ceremoniously sealed and
enrolled among the definitive expositions of the law, it was nov, avail-
able, with very little dusting off, as precedent. The quotation of a fewr
passages and paraphrasing of others from the Curliss-Wright case and
incidentally perhaps adding unobtrusively a key-word or twvo made
easy Mr. Justice Sutherland's task in the Belmont case. That the
facts which had called forth the Cvrtiss-Wrigit decision differed in a
very material sense from those in the Belmont case (especially the fact
of legislative delegation of authority) and that therefore that decision
in a strict sense was not appropriate precedent for the Belmont case did
not trouble Mr. Justice Sutherland. After all, the Curliss-Wright case
had also involved the exercise of authority by the President and the
Curtiss-Wright case had used broad and ambiguous words which ap-
parently were applicable in the Belmont case. Such is often the manner
of the evolution of the law. Nor is it necessarily objectionable.
The theory of the Crtiss-Wriglit and Belmont decisions may be
summarized in the following propositions:
(1) There are a "mass" of functions to be performed by government
in any political society.
(2) The authority to perform the "mass" of functions must reside in
some governmental agency.
(3) The Constitution of the United States, on the one hand, en-
visaged a government able to perform all the necessary duties
and on the other hand, distributed the power betwveen two units
of government agencies-the states and national government.
(4) Only the internal powers were distributed by the Constitution.
(5) External powers were inherited by the National government as
Professor Borchard's position on the recognition question appears to be the Eoundest. The
refusal to extend recognition may be a wise political move, but whether we or othervwis,
it is a political move with which the courts need not concern themselves at all. It is not for
foreign courts to pass ethical judgment on the "goodness" of another government's acts-,
Borchard, supra note 10; Moore, The Aew Isolation (1933) 27 Ax. J. LN-r. L. C07. For a
general discussion of our traditional policy of recognition, see J. B. lcoma, Pnmzcirns Or-
AmzICnxc DIPLomAcy (1918); B. H. WILLmS, A1_.rmucAx DinLo vcy: POLmcrEs A,D
PRACTICE (1936).
12. See United States v. Belmont, 35 F. :2d) S42 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), where the District
Court had said (not held) that it would be contra the public policy of New York to give
effect to the assignment because it was traceable to confiscation of property and therefore
did not recognize the Nationalization Decrees.
13. Compare United States v. Curtiss=Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319-20
(1936) and United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 330-1 (1937). Mr. Justice Doauglas
takes the crowning step in this development in United States v. Pint., 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
For an invaluable statement of precedent, see LLEwELLYN, Tim BrnAmLE Busa (1930)
62-6.
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successor to the Crown, because there was a national state before
there were "independent" states. The Constitution neither
granted nor allocated these powers and, therefore, considerations
arising either out of specific provisions of the Constitution or the
constitutional system generally are inapplicable.
(6) The Constitution established a fixed distribution of internal
powers. A stationary line divides the internal powers and duties
of the governmental units. Changing conditions cannot effect
the original distribution of domestic powers between the states
and federal government.
(7) A fluctuating line oscillating with the evolving conditions sepa-
rates domestic from international functions. The evolution of
society may remove a subject from the internal to the external
realm, with the consequent removal from the jurisdiction of one
governmental unit to that of another. Changing conditions can-
not, however, affect the internal distribution of authority.
Thus, the founding fathers' conception of domestic and interna-
tional problems is not binding today. In any analysis of what consti-
tutes an internal question, and what is a proper subject of international
negotiation, the changed world conditions may properly be taken into
account. But the framers' conception of local and national is still bind-
ing. Hence, doubts as to the sphere of authority into which a problem
falls or which governmental agency may properly exercise the function
may be readily resolved by referring to the Constitution. 14
THE ORIGIN OF THE THEORY
In view of Justice Sutherland's faithful adherence to the conservative
block of the bench on domestic questions,"6 it is of interest to investi-
gate the development of his radical position regarding the scope of the
federal government's authority as to international affairs. The basis for
the difference in his approach-the theory of the difference in the origin
14. Professor Patterson has summarized very pointedly the meaning of Mr. Justice
Sutherland's opinion in the Curtiss-Wright case as follows:
"(1) That there never were any 'states as such' in this country, (2) that the Conti-
nental Congress in issuing the Declaration of Independence assumed authority to separate
the colonies from Great Britain and acted on its own initiative as a group of individuals
rather than as an instructed agent merely announcing the will of the colonies previously
declared in their individual and corporate capacity, and (3) that in external affairs the
powers of the national government are not derived from the 'consent of the governed,' and
(4) that the President possesses this complete, plenary, and governmental, and, therefore,
undelegated sovereignty in foreign affairs, except as to the appointment of foreign repre-
sentatives and treaty making. . . ." Patterson, In re United States v. CurtissoWright Corp.
(1944) 22 TEX. L. REv. 286, 445.
15. Mason, The Conservative World of Mr. Justice Sutherland, 1883-1918 (1938) 32
AM. POL. Sci. Rav. 443.
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of the two types of powers, internal and external-though emphasized
in these cases and already mentioned in a previous decision,10 is to be
found in more complete form in his earlier writings. The full import of
the recent decisions are realized only if one takes into account his previ-
ous expositions on the subject. Moreover the analysis of his earlier
writings is of interest because of the light that it throws on the process
involved in the formulation of decisions.
Senator Sutherland first outlined his theory of the origin and scope
of the powers of the government in an article in 1909. It is especially
interesting to compare the language in that article with his subsequent
utterances from the bench.17
"Much of the confusion [concerning the true nature of the powers
of the government] has resulted from a failure to distinguish be-
tween our internal and our external relations ...
"It is clear from a consideration of the events leading up to and
surrounding the adoption of the Constitution that the primary pur-
pose of the specific enumeration of the powers of the General Gov-
ernment over internal matters was to preclude any encroachment
of that Government upon those powers which it was deemed the
state governments should exclusively possess. . . . The effect of
the enumeration is therefore quite as much to affirm the possession
of these unenumerated powers to the several States, as it is to deny
them to the General Government. Over its internal affairs the
state government possesses every power not delegated to the Gen-
eral Government, or prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States or the state constitution. It will therefore be seen that, in
this way, every power which any government in the world possesses
over its internal affairs, is vested either in the United States or in
the several States, unless affirmatively prohibited. . . . Is it not
reasonable to conclude that it was likeNise within the contempla-
tion of the framers of the Constitution that every necesary and
proper power possessed by foreign governments over their exlernal
affairs should be exercised by the Government of the United States
over our external affairs? . . . They were anxious to keep for the
people of each State in the fullest measure their right of local self-
government, but there was not shown anywhere a disposition to
curtail the power of the National Government in its external rela-
tions. On the contrary, there was clearly manifest a desire to make
such power, in the words of the Annapolis recommendation, 'ade-
quate to the exigencies of the Union.' The Declaration of Inde-
pendence asserted it when that great instrument declared that the
United Colonies as free and independent States (that is, as United
States, not as separate States) 'have full power to levy war, con-
16. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
17. Sutherland, The Internal and External Powers of the National Garrnrmenl, Sm. Doc.
No. 417, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
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clude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all
other acts and things which independent States may of right do.'
"And so national sovereignty inhered in the United States from
the beginning. Neither the Colonies nor the States which succeeded
them ever separately exercised authority over foreign affairs. Prior
to the Revolution the Colonies were independent of each other, but
all owed common allegiance to the Crown of Great Britain. They
were invested with and exercised in subordination to the Crown cer-
tain governmental functions of a purely local and internal charac-
ter, but so far as foreign relations were concerned the Imperial Gov-
ernment exercised plenary authority. When they severed their con-
nection with Great Britain, they did not do so as separate Colonies,
but as the United States of America, and they declared not the sev-
eral Colonies, but the United Colonies to be free and independent
States-not New York or Georgia, or South Carolina severally-
but all the Colonies in their united and collective capacity. This dec-
laration was an assertion of and constituted the first step toward
nationality. . . . These powers [over external affairs] were never
delegated by the States; they were never possessed by the States,
and the States could not delegate something which they did not
have ....
Congress has from time to time .. . passed laws that by
no reasoning can be justified under any or all of the express powers
by virtue of any implication to be drawn therefrom. Some of these
acts have been passed upon by the Supreme Court, while others
have never been considered by that tribunal. Members of the Court
have from time to time broadly announced the doctrine that the
General Government is one of enumerated powers, and can exercise
no authority not expressed or implied in the written words of the
Constitution, yet some of the decisions can be logically justified
only upon the theory that the Government possesses certain powers
which result from the fact that it's a National Government and the
only Government capable of exercising the powers in question....
"Here then [referring to Jones v. United States] is at least one
case where the Supreme Court has sustained Congress in exercising
a power not expressly granted by the Constitution, nor capable of
being inferred from any one of the express powers, nor from any
group of them, nor from all combined. Manifestly the act of Con-
gress was a naked usurpation unless it could be justified upon the
ground that the Government of the United States possesses certain
sovereign powers resulting from the National status. In other
words, the act was extra-constitutional. Was it on that account nec-
essarily un-constitutional? The Court said not."
Mr. Sutherland, then, concludes:
"The American people, in whom all sovereign authority ulti.-
[Vol. 55 :467
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mately resides, have provided as the instrument for the practical
expression of this authority a complete governmental system, con-
sisting of the General Government and the state governments, and
in this system has vested every power necessary to accomplish the
constitutionally declared ends of the government. Because of the
dual character of the agency which exercises the domestic sover-
eignty of the people the line between the state and federal powers
has been carefully drawn and must be rigidly observed, but whether
upon one side of the line or the other plenary governmental power
adequate to every exigency will be found. Over external matters,
however, no residuary powers do or can exist in the several States,
and from the necessity of the case all necessary authority must be
found in the National Government, such authority being expressly
conferred or implied from one or more of the express powers, or from
all of them combined, or resulting from the very fact of nationality
as inherently inseparable therefrom." 18
Soon after Mr. Sutherland's retirement from the Senate he was to
have another opportunity to outline his theory. He was invited to
deliver a series of lectures on the George Blumenthal Foundation at
Columbia University. He chose as his theme the general subject,
"Constitutional Power and World Affairs." 11 In this series Mr. Suther-
land elaborated upon his previous exposition. The basic thesis, that
there is an underlying difference in the origin and nature of the internal
and external powers is reiterated throughout the discussion. A few
quotations will suffice to show Mr. Sutherland's consistency on the
subject.
"Heretofore, these powers [referring to the external powers] have
seemed remote and have received relatively scant general considera-
tion. Our attention has been chiefly absorbed by matters exclu-
sively our own. Suddenly, however, we found ourselves in the
midst of a struggle involving the fate of humanity, and the era of
national isolation was at an end. The powers of the national gov-
ernment over external affairs, all at once, therefore have assumed
new and increased importance, in the light of which, a re-examina-
tion of their nature and extent is not only pertinent but may, sooner
or later, become highly necessary; for it is certain that hereafter,
whether desired or desirable, we shall be obliged to occupy a larger
place in the affairs of the world, to participate to a far greater de-
gree in world policies and lend substantial and increased assistance
toward the solution of world problems.... Inevitably, we shall be
called upon to deal, not only with some of the old questions from a
different point of view, but with many new questions which the
framers of the Constitution foresaw dimly, or foresaw not at all.
"In this new and extended relationship, we shall probably be
18. Id. at 1-4, 7, 8, 12.
19. G. Su 'HI.xnD, CosrTrnUIoNAL POWER ANM WORLD ArrAms (1919).
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obliged to extend the scope and application of the familiar mean-
ings of the Constitution and it may be to find-though not to
make-new meanings." 20
Indeed a strange doctrine for Mr. Sutherland to espouse! 21
The material from Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinions and writing
has been quoted at length in order to give the reader an idea of identity
between his writing and formal opinions. Not only is there a con-
sistency as to ideas, but in fact quotation of language. Few men indeed
are in the happy position of being able to give their writings and
speeches the status of the law. It is an interesting manifestation of the
process by which law can evolve that Mr. Justice Sutherland even re-
stated the issue in the Curtiss-Wright decision-perhaps an opportunity
to state his viewpoint. The issue as stated by the lower courts and by
counsel was whether the delegation met the standards for a valid dele-
gation of legislative authority. Mr. Justice Sutherland restated the
question: Do the limitations as to delegations of authority apply at all
in the case of matters within the field of foreign affairs? Moreover,
20. Id at 26-7; see also 21, 36-8, 44-7, 55, 116-9, 156. His statement regarding the
exercise of the treaty power is more of the same.
"In no instance was the treaty-making power ever exercised, or this essential attribute
of sovereignty ever possessed, by any state separately. Governments come and go-heredi-
tary rulers give place to elected rulers-allegiance changes-but sovereignty is immortal.
It is never in suspension searching for a possessor. . . . When, therefore, sovereignty over
the American colonies ceased to exist in the British Crown, it immediately passed to the
States, not severally but in their united and corporate capacity, where it has ever since re-
mained, being exercised, in turn, by the several governmental agencies which were consti-
tuted by the general authority. The treaty-making power then, like the war-making powers,
has always been vested in the Nation, and exercised by national instrumentalities. The
provisions respecting it in the Constitution, in so far as the respective powers of the states
and the Nation are concerned, are purely declarative, and; in so far as the general govern-
ment is concerned, are confirmative rather than creative. In accordance with the principles
already discussed this power would have passed to the general government instituted by the
Constitution, as the lineal successor of the preceding national agencies, in the absence of
prohibitions or otherwise clearly evinced intention to the contrary. . . . The treaty-making
power is not, therefore, one of the powers delegated or surrendered by the several states,
since it was never theirs to relinquish. It is an original acquisition of the people of the
United States in their national capacity, part and parcel of the general and exclusive sov-
ereignty of the Nation over all external affairs. . . ." Id. at 117-8.
And, with the zeal of a prophet he pleads:
"We must cease to measure the authority of the general government only by what the
Constitution affirmatively grants, and consider it also in the light of what the Constitution
permits from failure to deny." Id. at 172.
21. Mr. Justice Sutherland shows similar consistency in his views as to the domestic
powers of the government. For example, in a speech before the American Bar Association,
shortly before ascending to the bench, he outlined his position as to the constitutionality of
National Child Labor legislation under the Commerce power. Sutherland, Private Rights
and Government Control (1917) REPORT oF TnE 40m ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
BAR AssocrATioN 197, 212-4.
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the effect of the delegation was not in a foreign country, and so there
was not, as Mr. Justice Sutherland would have it, a question involv-
ing the constitutionality of the exercise of the foreign relations power.
Since the proclamation operated in the United States it could have been
disposed of as an exercise of the commerce power.22
The development of the "inherent powers" doctrine is more under-
standable when Mr. Justice Sutherland is considered as an individual,
not a judge, in his determination of cases before the Court. His per-
sonal opinions, beliefs, habits, prejudices, cherished theories, inarticu-
late premises, and so forth, are reflected in his opinions. -3 Recently, the
question of the extent to which judicial utterances are influenced by the
convictions of the justices has been the subject of national debate.24
Opinions have varied from one extreme to the other. Some have in-
sisted that judicial utterances are in fact only "justice incarnate"; that
some sort of "plenary inspiration" descends upon the members of the
court constituting the majority in promulgating the law. Montesquieu
stated this theory as follows: "The judges of the nation are only the
mouths that pronounce the words of the law, inanimate beings, who
can moderate neither its force nor its vigor." 25 This maybe called the
"objective" theory or the analytical school; Professor Cohen has
labelled it "the phonographic theory of the judicial function." 0
Opposed to this school is the view that decisions bear the influence
of the judge's personal idiosyncracies and petty habits. - In a word,
the drives which affect other people in their work affect the judge too.
This theory stated in more moderate terms is that judges are human
and that the "great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do
not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by;" :3 or "that de-
cisions of the courts on economic and social questions depend upon
their [the judges'] economic and social philosophy." 0 This has been
22. Quarles, The Federal Goernment: As to Foreign Affairs. Are Its Powers InT.crent
as Distinguised from Delegated? (1944)32 GEO. L. J. 375,378. (It should be noted that once
the issue in Curtiss-Wright re executive authority is stated as broadly as that, then his an-
swer becomes applicable in the BeImont case).
23. See especially CARDozo, Tan NATUmm OF THE JUDICL PnCcass (1932), alzo,
TE GROWTH OF THm LAw (1924); J. C. Gruty, TE NMTUr .,D SounCES op T=- LAW
(1909); HuGHEs, TE Stsxrxise COURT OF TrnM UTTED STATES (1928); Fnfu-n, LAW A"
T=E MODERN MIND (1930); HOLnEs, Tan Co-ioN LAw (1881), CoLLEcrED LEGAL PULTS
(1921); Pou-ND, Ax INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY Op LAW (1922).
24. The Supreme Court "Packing" fight of 1937.
25. Esprit des Lois, XI, c. vi: see also Chief Justice Marzhall in Ohbornev. Banl of the
United States, 9 %heat. 738, 866 (U. S. 1824).
26. See Fn Nx, op. cit. supra note 23, c. XIII, also p. 33 for quotation from Cohen.
27. For a discussion of the influence of the judge's personality on decisions, see ruz,
op. cit. supra note 23, c. XII.
28. CARnozo, THE NATuRE OF THE JUDIcI.L PROCESs (1932) 170.
29. Theodore Roosevelt, 43 CONG. Rzec. (part I) 21 (1903), cited in CAnuozo, op. cit.
supra note 28 at 171. See also Holmes' dissenting opinions in Lochner v. New York, 193
19461
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referred to as the "subjective" or "sociological" theory of jurisprudence.
The adoption of the latter, realistic approach towards Justice Suther-
land's opinions will not, it is hoped, disturb those who have been accus-
tomed to view the utterance of the Supreme Court as divinely inspired,
or as sections of the Constitution in animate form. Nevertheless, a care-
ful check indicates that the whole theory and a great amount of its
phraseology had become engraved on Mr. Sutherland's mind before he
joined the Court, waiting for the opportunity to be made the law of the
land. The circumstances show that he had pre-formed opinions on the
subject and that when he spoke in the Curtiss-Wright decision, he did
little to reexamine his long cherished ideas.3" Nor is there anything
disturbing about this. It is only to be expected, and even to be hoped,
that justices should give expression to carefully thought out ideas. The
view that the mere appointment to the court has an ablutionary effect,
causing men to lose all their individuality and become mere instruments
through which justice speaks, lacks all elements of realism. And though
Mr. Justice Sutherland has given his approval to just that sort of an an-
alysis of the judicial process 31 it certainly cannot be said that his
ascent to the bench freed him from his earlier conceptions.
VALIDITY OF THE THEORY
Mr. Justice Sutherland's theory of the scope of the external powers
based on his analysis of its origin has been outlined. It has also been
shown that on the basis of the decisions in the Curtiss-Wright and
Belmont cases the Supreme Court has built a whole edifice as to the
nature of the foreign relations power, especially as to the role of the
President.3 2 It remains now to examine validity of the theory.3
U. S. 45, 74 (1905) and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 277 (1918), as to the influence
of "inarticulate major premises" on judicial opinion. For excellent studies of the influence
of prevailing political and economic theories on decisions see HAINES, T=. REVIVAL OF
NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930) and WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATION or NATURAL
LAW (1931). For a discussion of the influence of value judgments on administrative officials,
see Levitan, The Neutrality of the Public Service (1942) 2 Pun. ADI. Rav. 317 and Political
Ends and Administrative Means (1943) 3 PUB. ADX. REv. 353.
30. The fact that Mr. Justice Paterson had suggested the same theory does not affect
the validity of the analysis. The fact is that Mr. Justice Sutherland when called upon to
decide the issue simply quoted his earlier writings-apparently with little de novo research.
See Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54 (U. S. 1795).
31. See Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion for the majority in United States v. Butler, 297
U. S. 1 (1936), where Mr. Justice Sutherland was joined as part of the majority..
32. Levitan, Executive Agreements: A Study of the Executive in the Control of the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1940)'35 ILL. L. REv. 365 and Constitutional Developments in
the Control of Foreign Affairs: A Quest for Democratic Control (1945) 7 JOURNAL OF POLITICS
58. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942). See especially McDougal and Lans,
Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements (1945) 54 YALE L. J. 181, 534
(a sound analysis with a conclusion questionable on policy grounds).
33. It should be stated that the writer is not primarily a constitutional historian, His
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Mr. Justice Sutherland's theory, in its most rudimentary form, is
that the states of the American revolution never possessed external
sovereignty; that the treaty-making power, an attribute of sovereignty,
has always been possessed by a national organ, to the exclusion of the
states; and that the states never conducted any foreign relations. Had
Mr. Justice Sutherland limited himself to the usual platitudes about
national sovereignty, there would have been no occasion for this in-
quiry. The ambiguity of the terms bars any attempt at refutation.
But fortunately Justice Sutherland places his reliance upon historical
facts rather than on glittering generalities. It is the correctness of the
historical data that is challenged. The long and bitter historical con-
troversy over state sovereignty, which culminated in the Civil War,
obscured the historical facts surrounding the question "whether there
was an American national state in the Revolution, and whether Con-
gress or the State governments exercised the sovereign power." 31
It is now proposed to turn once again from the gloss to the text.
The question whether the external powers were always lodged in a na-
tional agency can be answered accurately only after an examination of
documents setting forth the powers and instructions of the representa-
tives to the central agency-the first and second Continental Con-
gresses; the acts performed by the central agency; the powers of the
states as incorporated in their organic laws, and finally, an examination
of the extent of state participation in external affairs. Also, in analyz-
ing the meaning of documents and evaluating the significance of state-
ments made during this period, and in thinking about TMr. Justice
interest in the field is chiefly a by-product of work in public law. ALo the ensuing dizcmlon
is limited to an examination of only one aspect of the Sutherland theory-the origin of the
powers. I have already touched on the "executive authority" aspect in previous articles.
See material cited in note 32 supra.
34. In the preparation of this part the vriter made extensive use of Profez-or Small's
study, The Beginnings of A=erican ATalionality in (1890) 8 HoptaNs STUDIES IN HIsroRucAL
AND POLIC.AL SCINnCE, and Van Tyne, Sovereignly in the American Rervlrtior: An Histori-
cal Study (1907) 12 Am. Hist. REv. 529. These two articles will hereafter be cited Eimply as
Small and Van Tyne. See also McLAUGHLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISroRY (1935), esp~cially
83, 134-5; C. H. BUTLER, THE TREATY-MARING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1902),
especially 235-S4; 2 HAYNEs, TrE SENATE OF THE UNITED SrnTrEs (193S), 572-5; The
Declaration qf Independence, 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL EcONOtO ,
AND OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES; Slate Sercvignty, id. in Vol. 3;
Scott, Treaty Making Under the Authority of the Unikd States (1934) 28 P=oCErEDR'GS .A.nI-
CAN SOCIErTY OF INTERNATI O.L LAW 2. (The article will hereafter be cited simply as Scott).
For the traditional exposition see 1 G. T. CuRnTIs, Co.NsTiTUTiO.AL Hisiony OF T
UNITED STATES (1889) cc. I-XV; VoN HOLST, THE CoNsTITTIO.,AL- A;D POLiTICAL His-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1889); and authorities cited by Van Tyne at 529, 530. Se
also Patterson, supra note 14. Though the main work on this article was completed bMfore
the publication of Professor Patterson's articles, the final draft vas checked against Pro-
fessor Patterson's study. Happily, we are in agreement with regard to Mr. Justice Suther-
land's exposition of history. No attempt has been made to add specific references on the
basis of Professor Patterson's or Mr. Quarles' articles.
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Sutherland's theory, it is well to bear in mind that it was the heyday
of Lockian philosophy in America;35 that if any proposition had general
acceptance, it was that the people were sovereign and that all authority
stemmed from them. There is, therefore, an insuperable objection on
theoretical grounds to the acceptance of the Sutherland thesis. Gov-
ernment just was not thought to have any "hip-pocket" unaccountable
powers. ,But did the people really operate on the basis of their belief
that those exercising authority had to derive their power by delega-
tions? Or, was the theory of limited authority, in this case of the
central body, a mere theory brooding somewhere in the sky? The fol-
lowing paragraphs aim to make clear the nature of the limitations im-
posed upon the central body and its agents and it is fair to say that the
agents of that day believed as much in the binding effect of the delega-
tions as those doing the delegating. Therefore the statements of the
delegations are a fair measure of the authority that they believed they
had and would normally exercise.
The Colonies in 1774. The first point of significance is that the colo-
nies, while under English rule, were free and independent of each other.
These colonies constituted thirteen distinct corporations, and all at-
tempts at unity had failed." There is no disagreement that this atti-
tude of distinctness prevailed at least until the period of the Conti-
nental Congress.37 Hence, it is to be determined to what extent this
attitude was modified in the succeeding period.
Sovereignty in the First Continental Congress. Was the First Conti-
nental Congress a de facto and de jure sovereign power by virtue of
original authority derived from the people? 38 An examination of the
instructions of the various delegations reveals that it was not. They
were:
". to devise, consult, and to adopt measures as may have the
most likely tendency ... to restore that peace, harmony, & mu-
tual confidence. .... 39
35. MERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES (1903), especially c. 11;
CARPENTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMIERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1930); 3 DUNNING,
A HISTORY OF POLITiCAL THEORIES (1920), c. III; GETTELL, HISTORY OF AMERICAN Po-
LITIrcAL THOUGHT (1928), c. IV, and bibliography at 117-8; Goebel, Constlitutional i$.
tory and Constitutional Law (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 551, 571-3.
36. Small, at 14-5. Though sight should not be lost of the fact that various colonies
were for a long time joined under a single executive (Pennsylvania and Delaware, New York
and New Jersey, North and South Carolina, New Hampshire and Massachusetts) this fact
does not contradict the meaning in the text, if taken in a more general sense. All attempts
at general unity failed-and each was a separate colony.
37. Small at 15-6.
38. 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (4th ed.
1873) 140.
39. 1 FORD, JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 (1904-1914) 15
(New Hampshire). Hereinafter cited as JOURNALS OF CONGRESS.
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"... to consult upon the present states of the Colonies ... and
to deliberate and determine upon wise and proper measures, to be
by them recommended to all the Colonies, for . . . the restoration
of union & harmony between Great Britain and the Colonies, most
ardently desired by all good men.-"
"... to consult and advise on proper measures for advancing the
best good of the Colonies, and such conferences, from time to time,
to report to this house [Connecticut legislature]." 41
The tenor of these instructions permeates the others. 42 Only North
Carolina invested the delegates "with such powers as may make any
acts done by them, or consent given in behalf of this province obliga-
tory in honour upon every inhabitant hereof. . .." 43 The delegates
were invariably sent to find, through joint consultation, the best path
by which the "peace and harmony" could be reestablished. On the
basis of an analysis of the journals of the Congress, Professor Small
concludes, that "there was nothing administrative or governmental
about the organization of that body." 4 Its proceedings were limited
"to statements of grievances and appeals for relief." 15 If, then, it be
established that the first Continental Congress was not exercising the
sovereign power, what may be said about the Second Congress?
Sovereignty in the Second Continental Congress. While the delegates'
instructions manifest a much clearer definition of purpose, there is a
definite lack of evidence of any change of view as to the nature of the
central organization.4 1 Even then three of these delegations were
merely to represent, to attend, meet, and report;-" two to join, consult,
and advise;," six to concert and agree or determine upon;" while
Georgia's delegates were to do, transact, join and concur with the
several delegates.5" These various means were to be used, still for the
purpose of "fostering harmony," or "accommodating the unhappy
differences." 11 And though eight of the colonies sent new instructions
40. Id. at 15-6 (Massachusetts-Bay).
41. Id. at 17-8 (Connecticut).
42. For a more extensive list of quotations see Small at 18-22 and 2 Journ=,Ls or- Co!.-
GRESS 15-30.
43. 1 JOURNALS OF CONGREss 30.
44. Small at 23. For a similar conclusion see Van Tyne at 530.
45. Van Tyne at 530.
46. Small at 45.
47. New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Virginia.
48. Connecticut and Rhode Island.
49. Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Maryland, Delayare and New
York.
50. VanTyneat531.
51. For a full statement of the instructions, see 2 JOuRNL S OF CoNGREsS, Credentials
of Delegates; also quoted by Small at 45-S.
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before January 1776,52 no change of attitude is perceivable. 3 With the
instructions in mind, let us examine briefly the acts of this Congress.
Mr. Justice Story says: "The Congress of 1775 accordingly assumed
at once the exercise of some of the highest functions of sovereignty," 11
listing the raising of a national army and navy, raising money, emitting
bills of credit, contracting debts upon the national account, and au-
thorizing captures and condemnation of prizes. While the Congress
did all this it is essential to remember that in so doing the delegates
exceeded the letter of their instructions. Even though they violated
the letter of the instruction an examination of the debates reveals that
they were definitely conscious of their advisory capacity; that they had
a singular realization that the Congress owed its establishment to the
critical conditions, and that with the passing of these conditions the
Congress would be dissolved; and that the chief reason for its creation
was to make the colonial plea more effective and thereby "restore
harmony" with Great Britain more rapidly. They did not view them-
selves as members of a defacto or de jure government. The statements
of the Congress are the best evidence of its intentions. "We have not
raised armies with ambitious designs of separating from Great Britain,
and establishing independent states." 11 Earlier in the same declara-
tion: "We assure them (our friends and fellow-subjects in any part of
the empire) that we mean not to dissolve that union... which we sin-
cerely wish to see restored." 11 Unless one attributes the highest degree
of hypocrisy to these testimonials one cannot possibly view the actions
of the Congress as the acts of a sovereign government. Taking up arms
in defense of their rights as Englishmen to force the repeal of obnoxious
measures, and remaining loyal to the Crown and Empire were not in-
compatible. Indeed, the Puritans of the previous century, even in be-
heading Charles I, continued to profess their loyalty as subjects, to the
Crown-though not to a tyrannical occupant of it. But a desire for an
American national state and the idea of loyalty to the Crown were in-
compatible. 5 One is forced to agree that "if Congress was doing seem-
ingly sovereign acts, it was merely in the capacity of a party committee
leading a rebellious faction in the empire in the attempt to force the
52. Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Connecti-
cut and Pennsylvania.
53. Only Maryland and Connecticut changed their instructions, Maryland removing
the clause "And this Province bind themselves to execute . . ." and Connecticut making
"Defense, Security, and preservation of the Rights" the objects to be attained. 2 JOURNALS
OF CONGRESS 245,3 JOURNALS OF CONGREss 441,4 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 57-8.
54. 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 38 at 151-2.
55. 2 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 155, also earlier drafts at 139.
56. Ibid., note especially the use of the word "union."
57. Van Tyne at 534.
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concession of its rights." s Nor was the Congress of 1775 exercising
any authority over the colonies."
This position remained basically unaltered even after the Declaration
of Independence. The Congress remained a convenient center of in-
telligence and a source of advice which would keep their (the states')
forces united."0 Upon the severance of ties with Great Britain, sov-
ereign and independent states continued to be leagued together for the
duration of the fight. In a word, the Congress was a committee of
safety having as its basic aim the defeat of Great Britain.0 At no time
was it viewed, nor did it view itself as a governmental organization
having legislative authority. It is true that it was in Congress that the
Declaration of Independence was adopted. But it is equally true that
each delegation had to receive authorization from its colony, and that
the decision for independence was based upon the instructions from the
colonies. In the debates upon these very resolutions, it was said,
"That if the delegates of any particular colony had no power to declare
such colony independent, certain they were the others could not de-
clare it for them; the colonies being as yet perfectly independent of
each other." 62 If further proof be needed to establish beyond all doubt
that the Congress did not deem itself to be possessed of any inherent
authority and that the states did not view its acts as binding, the sub-
sequent ratification by the states of the Declaration ought to dispel
58. ibid.
59. As Small points out in his conclusions as to the nature of the Congrc:a of 1775,
"The Congress doubtless exceeded the letter of the instruction received by a portion of
its members; but this was not from any misconception of those instructions, nor from any
uncertainty about the essentially advisory character even of those of its proceeding3 which
appeared most peremptory. In pointing out to the colonies the direction which their prepa-
rations for resistance ought to take, the Congress no more acted upon an imagined authority
to command the colonies, than does the lookout at the bow of the ship, when he rmports the
direction of danger to the officer of the deck. ... I am unable to find a single eidence,
however, that the members ever entertained a doubt about their actual subordination to the
colonial assemblies which they represented ....
' . . In a word, the Congress of 1775 did no act by any power other than that which
the separate corporations represented individually contributed .... Its history forms a
record of localism rising superior to itself, to meet the demand of a crisis. That imagination
runs riot which turns this magnificent effort into the definitive abdication of localism. The
last time the proposal of centralization was formally broached, it was rejected." Small at
73-6.
60. Van Tyne at 535.
61. The 'Maryland convention very excellently summarized the function of the Con-
gress:
"The best and only proper exercise [of the powers of Congress] . .. can be inadopting
the wisest measures of equally securing the right and liberties of each of the United States,
which was the principle of their union." 2 ScEunr, HisoRY or 1LtnYLAm, (1S79) 276.
cited in Van Tyne at 535.
62. 6 JouRNIALs oF ConGREss 108S. Notes of the debates furnished to James Madicon
by Thomas Jefferson in his handwriting as a copy from his original notes.
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any such doubts. 3 Mr. Sutherland and others have made much of the
wording in the Declaration of Independence, "that these United Colo-
nies are, and of Right, ought to be Free and Independent States: .. .
and that, as Free and Independent States, they have full power to levy
War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and do
all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do." 04
But a careful reading of the states' resolves ratifyingthe Declaration
clearly shows that they deemed themselves individually independent,
and that the word "United" means no more than united in their tem-
porary pursuit, with no intention of setting up a permanent union."5
Richard Henry Lee did introduce on June 7, 1776, together with the
resolution for independence, a resolution "that a plan of confederation
be prepared and transmitted to the respective Colonies for their con-
sideration and approbation." 68 The record hardly warrants a conclu-
sion that a permanent Union-other than for war purposes was here
envisaged. The attitude of the Pennsylvania convention regarding the
position of the states in 1776 was representative of the others; and its
declarations are illustrative of the meaning then attached to the phrases
of the Declaration quoted above.
"We, the Representatives of the freemen of the State of Penn-
sylvania, in General Convention assembled, taking into our most
serious consideration the clear, strong, and cogent reasons given by
the honourable Continental Congress for the declaring this, as well
as the other United States of America, free and independent, do
hereupon resolve, and be it hereby resolved and declared, that we,
in behalf of ourselves and our constituents, do unanimously ap-
prove of the said Resolution and Declaration of Congress ...;
and we do declare before God and the world, that we will support
and maintain the freedom and independence of this and the other
United States of America ... 67
63. Van Tyneat:537.
64. 5 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 514, wherein the text of the engrossed original in the
Department of State is used. See also id. at 515, n. 1.
65. North Carolina and Pennsylvania provided in their constitutions for delegates as
"long as it shall be necessary." Van Tyne at 535, n. 5; 2 POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANiC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
(2d ed. 1878) 1414, 1543.
66. 5 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 425.
67. 2 FORCE, AMERICAN ARCHIvES (5th series 1851) 10. Alsd, Resolve of State of Con-
necticut, in pursuance of the Declaration, "Resoled by this Assembly, That they approve of
the Declaration of Independence published by said Congress, and that this Colony is and of
right ought to be a free and independent State. . . ." At the same time it was enacted,
"That the form of civil government in this State shall continue to be as established by
Charter received from Charles the Second, . . . so far as an adherence to the same will be
consistent with an absolute independence of this State. . . ." 1 THE PUBLIC RrCORDS or
THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (1894) 3. See also Madison's statement in 1782 that the Crown
rights as such had not devolved upon Congress, an idea "so extravagant that it could not
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An examination of the declarations of the state legislatures, state con-
ventions, and of the leading individuals in the various states reveals a
general acceptance of the idea of state sovereignty.cS
Exercise of Sovereignty by States. More definitive proof as to the loca-
tion of sovereignty during this period is to be found in the provisions of
the constitutions and acts of the states." The South Carolina Consti-
tution of 1778, for example states:
"That the governor and commander in chief shall have no power
to commence war, or conclude peace, or enter into any final treaty
without the consent of the senate and house of representatives." "
Nor need we base our case purely on the statement of powers. It is to
be remembered that Mr. Justice Sutherland continually emphasizes
that the states never possessed the treaty-making power and never
exercised that attribute of sovereignty and, hence, it was impossible
for the States to delegate that power to the new central government.
The record of events leaves no doubt that treaty-making power was
exercised by the States.7'1
States and Foreign Affairs. In 1778, Mr. Gerard, in behalf of His
most Christian Majesty of France, and Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane
enter into the thought of man." Van Tyne at 538, n. 3, citing NEw Yomx H: rorucA%. So-
cmTY COLLECTioNS (1878) 147.
68. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a nationalist of the Theodore Roowevelt Echool,
concludes that "when the thirteen colonies jointly and severally threw off their allegiance
to the British Crown and became independent, all the usual rights of sovereignty v;hich
they had not before possessed vested, without restriction, in each one of the thirteen States."
LODGE, A FIG= G FRIGATE (1902) 225. See also Ware v. Hylton, 3 DalU. 193, 224 (U. S.
1796) for like statements.
69. It has been well said, "to mere assertions ... that the state is independent and
sovereign we need give little attention, but powers granted in Constitutional conventions
and acts of sovereignty done by state governments have greater importance." Van Tyne
at 539. For example of assertions of sovereignty see 1 PooRE, op. cit. supra note 65 at 257,
958; 2 id. at 1281, cited by Van Tyne at 539, n. 5.
70. 2 Pooma at 1625-6. For other e.xamples see Van Tyne at S40, n. 2.
71. Professor Scott, in an article already referred to, submits strikdng evidence to that
effect. It is interesting to note, also, Professor Scott's statement: "that the treaty-making
power was known to and exercised by the colonies long before their indep ndence--and
indeed before they ever thought of an independent existence-is evident from an e.ami-
nation of colonial records." Among the six examples cited in the article, the treaty between
Indian Nations and various American colonies is included. The details of the negotiations
are to be found in Witlanm Marsze's Journal of the Treaty Held with te Six Nations by Mke
Commissioners of Maryland and otler Provinces Hldd at Lancaster, in Pennsyranria, June,
1744,7 COLLECTIONS OF TE MASSAcnuIsETTs HSORicAL Soc=IETY FoR Tn YE' MDCCC
(1801) 171. Then, after reviewing a number of examples, Dr. Scott concludes, as regards
treaty-making before the Revolution:
"Treaty-making, international congresses, full-powered delegates, bilateral and multi-
lateral concords and agreements, therefore, were all part of the traditional American mode of
thinking when on July 4,1776, the thirteen American Colonies assembled in Philadelphia and
addressed their momentous declaration 'to a candid world." (Scott, supra note 34 at n. 7).
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and Arthur Lee, in behalf of the United States-enumerating the thir-
teen states, from north to south, signed the now famous Treaty of
Amity and Commerce and the Treaty of Alliance.72 But the states ap-
parently did not deem this treaty binding on them, until they had indi-
vidually ratified the treaty. The Virginia House of Delegates and the
Governor ratified these treaties and the instrument of ratification was
delivered to Mr. Gerard by the State's delegation in the Continental
Congress. These ratifications were deposited in the Foreign Office of
France, and there they may be found to this day. 3 Nor is this the only
example of direct participation by states in the conduct of foreign rela-
tions and of the exercise by the states in the conduct of foreign relations
and of the exercise by the states of "external" powers. Benjamin
Franklin writing to the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Congress,
on May 26, 1779, notes:
"I have mentioned above the application of separate States to
borrow money in Europe . . .when the general Congress are en-
deavoring to obtain a loan, these separate attempts interfere and
are extremely inconvenient; especially where some of the agents
are empowered to offer a higher interest, and some have powers in
that respect unlimited. We have likewise lately had applications
from three States to this court to be furnished with great quanti-
ties of arms, ammunitions, and clothing, or with money upon
credit to buy them, and from one State to be supplied with naval
stores and ships of war. These agents finding that they had not
interest to obtain such grants, have severally applied to me, and
seem to think it my duty, as minister for the United States, to sup-
port and enforce their particular demand." 74
On another occasion, Franklin, writing to Vergennes, specifically men-
tions the solicitations by Virginia and Maryland for arms, ammuni-
tions and clothing. He complained that he is even expected by their
agents to solicit for them, and "the respective States propose and
promise to pay for what is supplied each of them as soon as the war is
over." Ir A further examination is convincing that these are not isolated
72. 1 MALLOY, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS, ETC (1910) 468,479.
73. 4 DONIOL, HIsToIRE DE LA iARTICIPATION DE LA FRANCE A L'ETAI3LISSEMENT DES
9TATs-UNIs D'AwtRxQUE. Correspondance diplomatique et documents (1886) 155; Van
Tyne at 540; Scott, supra note 34 at 8-9. For an opposite interpretation of these facts, see
1 BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER (1902) 264, n. 2.
74. 3 WHARTON, THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF TUE UNITED
STATES (1889) 192.
75. Id. at 153. See also letter from W. Lee to Governor Jefferson. "His Excellency
Governor Henry, was pleased in 1777, with the advice of the Council, to appoint me Agent
in France, for the State of Virginia, & in 1788, by the same authority, he sent me a power
under the State Seal, to obtain Arms, Artillery, Ammunition, &c, of his most X-tian Maj-
esty. . . ." 1 PALMER, CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS,
1652-1781, PRESERVED IN THE CAPITOL AT RICHMOND (1875) 328-9.
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occurrences nor the aberrations of one particular state.-- Even Patrick
Henry, who was not a Virginian but an American in 1774, had by 1778
apparently undergone something of a change of heart. In the course of
the negotiations with Spain for a loan and for Spanish approval of the
erection of a fort on the Virginian border, he promised in behalf of
Virginia "the Gratitude of this free and independent country, the trade
in any or all its valuable productions, and the friendship of its warlike
inhabitants." 7 Virginia's diplomatic activities apparently became so
extensive as to necessitate the setting up of a special office, a "Clerkship
of Foreign Correspondence." 73
In the preceding paragraphs attention has been devoted primarily
to state participation in diplomatic negotiations. But tlis was not the
only external power exercised by the states. That they bought or sought
to buy military supplies has already been seen in the letters referred to
above, it is logically to be implied that these were to be used to outfit
their troops and naval forces. But not only did the several states or-
ganize their own forces; they even conducted their own individual cam-
paigns, as is shown by George Rogers Clark's campaign in behalf of
Virginia," or the ill-starred descent of the Massachusetts army in 1779
upon the Penobscot forts. ' In fact "much of the early war in the South
was carried on without the aid or advice of Congress." 11 The story is
the same as regards the organization of the navies, the laying of em-
bargoes, 2 the opening of ports to the outside world,83 and in every other
phase of war operationsS4 In brief, state exercise of the external powers
is to be seen throughout this period.3
76. Philip Mazzei was sent vith a like commission to Italy. 1 Ht-am, THE WrITIGS Or
JAIs NIADIsoN (1900) 138, n. 2; A. NEVINS, TnE AmERicAN STATES DuniNm A D Ar-r
THE REVOLUTION 1775-1789 (1924) (Hereinafter cited as NEVINs) 65340, citing be-sidz
Virginia and Maryland, South Carolina and Pennsylvania.
77. Library of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Clark :%MSS, LVIII, 103.
Cited by Van Tyne at 540; NEviNs at 659.
78. "Whereas it is necessary for the governor and council to be provided vith a perzon
learned in the modern languages for assisting them in communication vth foreign states.
.. .Be it therefore enacted, that a clerkship of foreign correspondence be henceforth es-
tablished. . . " 9 HENmG, STAT TEs AT LARGE (1821) 467.
79. 9id.at552.
80. NEviNs at 660.
81. Van Tyne at 541.
82. PAULLIN, THE NA VY OF THE A !r cA, REVOLUTION, ITs A!NI IsT %Tion, ITS
POLICY, AnD ITS AcIEEvENvn rs (1906) cc. XI-XV, 152. See NEvns at 659: "Nine States
• .. organized their ovn navies, and some States established their om system of privateer-
ing." 1 THE PuBLic RncoRVs OF THE STATE OF Co\ssEicUTcr (1894) 18, 63, 71; 9 HEING,
oP. cit. . uPra note 78 at 530 (Virginia Embargo).
83. In 6 joux Ats OF CONGRESS 1072, Wythe refers to the opening of the ports by the
Virginia Convention to all nations except British (including Ireland and West Indi6).
84. Van Tyne at 541-3.
85. The material cited has been drawn from the period until the establishment of the
Confederation. During the period from 1783-1789 numerous illustrations of state partici-
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The evidence here presented has led students of the period to an all
but unanimous conclusion as to the nature of the Union, the degree of
nationality, and the seat of sovereignty from 1776 to 1789. Allan
Nevins, the outstanding student on the American States for the period,
concludes:
"In all, the view that the United States in Congress assembled
constituted a nation, vested with all the attributes of sovereignty,
had much less currency from 1776 to 1787 than might be inferred
from the writings of statesmen like Hamilton, Madison, and Wash-
ington. The view was very general that Congress was simply a
meeting of ambassadors of thirteen independent and sovereign,
but leagued nations ...
"When individual delegates had any quarrel with Congress as a
body, they always fell back upon their diplomatic privileges .... ,, o
This analysis of the historical data reveals that there has persisted a
basic misinterpretation of early American history. It appears that at
the root of this misconception lies a failure to distinguish between a
consciousness of nationality and a national state. Certain basic forces
were at work which contained the germ of nationality, such as laws,
mores, geographic position, history and language, but it is an error to
confuse this with the idea of the state."7 That there was a composite
organization exercising authority, and that a desire for paramount
authority was expressed by many is certainly not to be denied. But a
pation in foreign affairs are available. See especially, A. C. McLAUGHLIN, THI CONFEDrRA-
TION AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1783-1789 (1905) cc. V and VI; J. FisKu, THE CRITICAL,
PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1783-1789 (1888) passim, especially 289-300. For an inter-
esting example of an outsider's view as to the treaty-making authority see answer of the
Duke of Dorset to the American Commissioners, regarding a treaty of commerce with Eng-
land, when he says, "I have been . . . instructed to learn from you, gentlemen, what is the
real nature of the powers with which you are invested, whether you are merely commissioned
by Congress, or whether you have received separate powers from the respective States,"
1 THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMEIRICA FROM TlE
TREATY OF PEACE TO THE ADOPTION OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION, 1783-1789 (1833-34)
x. Concerning foreign relations and war operations by the States, see Madison's speech at
the Constitutional Convention, 1 Farrand (ed.), THE RECORS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787 (1937) 314-25. It is interesting to recall that the Treaty of Peace with
Britain, 1783, specifically acknowledges "the said United States, viz., [listing the States by
name] to be free sovereign and independent States." 1 MALLOY, TREATIES AND CONVEN-
TIONS, ETC. (1910) 587. Professor Greene states: "Even in matters of general interest like
the conduct of the war and negotiations with foreign powers, the states sometimes acted
quite independently. So far, therefore, as legal theory is concerned, the case for state sov-
ereignty seems to be complete. . . ." E. B. GREENE, THE FOUNDATIONS Or AMERICAN NA-
TIONALITY (1935) 558. But see his statement, id. at 559, when he apparently believes Conti-
nental Congress to have been a defacto federal government.
86. NEVINS at 660 et seq.; 3 HUNT, op. cit. supra note 76 at 181.
87. Van Tyne at 544.
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study of the records excludes the acceptance of the conclusion that the
composite body was the authority or that the individual states heeded
the voice of this body. Its history "forms a record of localism rising
superior to itself, to meet the demands of a crisis. That imagination
runs riot which turns this magnificent effort into the definitive abdica-
tion of localism." sI
It is evident from an examination of the history of the period that
Mr. Justice Sutherland's theory that "the powers of external sov-
ereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to
the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United
States of America," does not harmonize with the facts. It simply was
not so.
It is important that it be noted that the objections thus far raised
against Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion in the Curliss-tWrighll case
has been directed against the stated legal rationale for the decision-
his exposition of history and use of that history as the foundation for
his conclusions. In this connection it should also be observed that the
objections to Mr. Justice Sutherland's theory would be valid even had
the various central bodies in the course of their existence assumed the
powers as to the control of foreign affairs. Certainly institutions operat-
ing in crisis situations may be forced to exercise powers beyond their
announced authority. That, however, would not support a conclusion
that it was the theory on which the institutions operated. The latter
8. Small at 76. For a further confirmation of the view in the text, Ee J. B. S icT, Tim
UNITED STATES OF A_cmErcA, A STUDY IN INTERNATIO,%L ORGANIZALTION. (1920).Sc J. B.
SCOTT, TaE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, TaE AnTICES OF CON ED=%TION., THE
CONSTITUTION OF TM UNITED STATES (1917) iv: "... . the States declaring their inde-
pendence were States in the sense of International Law.... . wisTo:, E-.cunvu
AGENTS IN AIImRcAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1929) states at 3-4 that during the Revolution
Congress exercised control over foreign relations without specific authority, but the "indi-
vidual states continued to send men abroad on state business." This is also Profecior
Bailey's general conclusion. Commenting on President Lincoln's statement in his inaugural
address that the founding fathers brought forth a Nation in 1776, Profeczor Bailey lays:
"He might better have said that those fathers had brought forth a number of small nations.
For during the six troubled years from the close of the Revolution to the establihenwt of
the present government in 1789 the United States consisted of thirteen zeparate sovcreigntie3
each going its own way." BAILEY, A DIPLO-iATIC HISTORY OF THE AIERJcAIN PEOMLE (1940)
37? J. B. ScoTT AND HUNT, JAms MADIsoN's NOTES or Dr.]EATs (1918); R. L. Scmnin,
Tan CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AN HtsromcAL SunvEy or ITs FoRnwAT1On
(1923) 16-17. The Supreme Court has upheld this view. Ware v. Hylton, 3 DalI. 198, 224,
237 (U. S. 1796). Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 736 (U. S. 1838). Statement of
the California court in People v. Gerke and Clark, 5 Cal. 3S1, 384 (1855), is also worthy of
notice. "Before the compact (organization of the government under the constitution), the
states had the power of treaty making as potentially as any power on earth; .. .By the
compact they expressly granted it to the Federal Government in general terms, and pro-
hibited it to themselves. The General Government must, therefore, hold it as fully as the
States held it. . . ." It is to be noted that Professor Scott's thesis is in agreement with this
view.
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can be discerned, it would appear, primarily by analyzing the then pre-
vailing theory of the institution checked against the story of their
actual operations. In terms of these indices there is little to support
Mr. Justice Sutherland's theory. It was not only the predominant
theory of that day that the states were independent entities but the
states also behaved that way.89
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE Curtiss-Wright CASE
The most significant aspect of the Curtiss-Wright decision is that it
gave authoritative and respectable status to the doctrine that the na-
tional government possesses powers completely outside of those in any
way assigned to it by the Constitution. Generally speaking, this means
that the doctrine that. the United States is a constitutionally limited
federal state applies only to purely domestic matters and that general
limitations arising out of the nature of the American system are not
applicable in the field of foreign affairs. There is even considerable
basis for interpreting the Curtiss-Wright decision to mean that there
are no substantive limitations on the scope of the foreign relations
power; that is, since it is an "extra-constitutional" power, extra-
constitutional acts cannot be un-constitutional. Though Mr. Justice
Sutherland does include a warning that the government could not
exercise the power in manner specifically prohibited by the Constitu-
tion-"a power which . .. like every other governmental power must
be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Con-
stitution' '-this limitation appears to affect only the procedural aspects
of treaty-making. The significance of Mr. Justice Sutherland's inter-
pretation of the nature and scope of the external powers of the national
government is found not so much in its novelty or practicable applica-
tion as in its sharp departure from the accepted canons of constitutional
interpretation and assumptions as to the nature of the American system
of government.
A few illustrations of recent statements by students of American
public law as to the scope of the treaty-making power will reveal that
before the Curtiss-Wright decision there was general agreement that
the national government could enter into international agreements as
to every internationally significant subject." A discussion between
89. See THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 64, 66, 69, 75; See Goebel, supra note 35 at 572, n. 49.
90. Levitan, Constitutional Developments in the Control of Foreign Affairs: A Quest for
Democratic Control (1945) 7 JOURNAL OF POLInCS 58. The more narrow interpretations were
emphasized by Jefferson, Madison and Calhoun and St. George Tucker. See especially,
JEFFERSON'S MANUAL 268; H. ST. G. TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING
POWER UNDER TE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1915); Q. WRIGHT, THE CON-
TROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) 130-4; 5 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1906) 156-71; 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1940-44)
5-25, 154 (hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MOORE, and HACKWORTH).
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Charles Henry Butler and Charles Evans Hughes at the 1929 meeting
of American Society of International Law is especially pertinent.
Mr. Butler, in the course of his paper said:
"A critical examination of the genesis, development, adoption,
construction and application in their historical and legal aspects of
the various provisions of the Constitution by which the states re-
nounced the treaty-making power for themselves and delegated it
to the Federal Government, and especially of Article VI which
makes treaties the supreme law of the land, in my opinion, neces-
sarily leads to the conclusion that there are no limitations on the
treaty-making power of the United States as to matters otherwise
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the States, and which result from
the sovereign jurisdiction of the States over such matters." 01
In explanation of his statement that "there are no limitations on the
treaty-making power," Mr. Butler continued:
"I do not mean to say that there are no limitations whatever on
the treaty-making power of the United States; but I do mean to say
that such limitations as may exist are those which exist as to every
sovereignty or which are imposed by provisions of the Constitution
itself." 92
Mr. Hughes, then president of the society and chairman of the meeting,
when asked to comment on what he considered the scope of the treaty-
making power, said:
"I think it is perfectly idle to consider that the Supreme Court
would ever hold that any treat, made in a constitutional manner
in relation to the external concerns of the nation is beyond the
power of the sovereignty of the United States or invalid under the
Constitution of the United States where no express prohibition of
the Constitution has been violated." 13
Mr. Hughes later added:
". .. the nation has the power to make any agreement whatever
in a constitutional manner that relates to the conduct of our inter-
national relations, unless there can be found some express prohibi-
tion in the constitution, and I am not aware of any which would in
any way detract from the power as I have defined it in connection
with our relations with other governments." "
In the course of the discussion Mr. Hughes sought to establish a cri-
terion as to what constitutes a proper subject of negotiation and what
91. See (1929) 23 PROCEEDINGS A,=icA., Socisry op I.xTr=,,Tio:,%, LAW 177.
92. Id. at 177-3; see Profesor T. W. Stimson's statement, id. at 135-9, for an oppo-
site view, holding that only matters within legislative authority of Congrezs may lba dealt
with by treaty.
93. Id. at 194.
94. Id. at 196.
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is strictly a domestic question. On the basis of the principle in .- louston,
East & West Texas Railway v. United States,9" he suggested the rule
that the national government may properly regulate by international
national agreement any local matter where the local matter becomes so
related to international affairs that an international regulation of the
field could not fully succeed unless the purely local aspects of the matter
were included. While speaking on the subject, Mr. Hughes, took the
occasion to clarify a previous remark of his concerning the scope of the
treaty-making power. At the 1928 meeting of the society, in the course
of his presidential address, referring to the refusal of the American
delegation to participate in the codification of Private International
Law, he had said:
"In view of our system of government in the United States, with
our forty-eight States and our federal government of limited power,
the United States could not join in this action . . ." go
It was clear that there was a considerable gap between the views ex-
pressed at these two meetings. Hence, he inserted the following ex-
planation:
"In so doing [refusing to join the negotiations] it was not neces-
sary to hold that it was beyond the treaty-making power, but it was
thought to be inadvisable to attempt to press the treaty-making
power in such a novel exercise and that to bring a treaty of that
sort to the consideration of the Senate would be a grave mistake." 97
Herein lies the real check on the treaty-making power-political ad-
visability. This change of attitude is reflected in the utterances of the
courts. The Court of Claims recently stated: "It has been so well
established that treaties entered into between Nations are political and
not judicial questions and courts cannot declare a treaty fraudulent or
non-effective, that it is unnecessary to cite authorities." s
95. 234 U. S. 342 (1914).
96. Hughes, The Outlook for.Pan-Americanism-Some Observations on the Sixth Interna-
tional Conferences of American States (1928) 22 PROCEEDINGS AMERICAN SocIETY OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 1, 12. The constitutional objection referred to in the text is that many of
the subjects considered for codification are matters over which, at least in the past have
been under state jurisdiction. It should be remembered that the accepted theory in 1928
of the internal powers of the Federal government was that it did not have a general police
power therefore no authority to deal with most of the matters covered by private law.
97. (1929) 23 PROCEEDINGS AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 195.
98. Eastern or Emigrant Cherokees and Western or Old Settler Cherokees v. United
States, 88 Ct. Cl. 452, 467 (1939). See also, United States v. Reid, 73 F. (2d) 153, 155
(C. C. A. 9th, 1934) where the court said: "It is doubtful if courts have power to declare the
plain terms of a treaty void and unenforceable, thus compelling the nation to violate its
pledged word, and thus furnishing a causus (sic) belli to the other contracting power."
HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817; THE DEVELOPMENT OF TH1E TREATY-
MAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE DURING THEIR FORMATIVE PERIOD
(1920).
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A review of the literature and judicial opinion reveals that during
this period (last quarter of a century) the broad interpretation of the
treaty-making power has become more generally accepted than ever
before in our history." These illustrations can be multiplied many fold.
Few would have dissented in 1935 from the proposition that though the
treaty-making power does not extend "so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids" it does extend to all proper subjects of interna-
tional negotiation.' It represented good law and good sense then; it
is still good sense. In the light of this already established position we
return to the question, what is the significance of the Curliss-Wright
opinion?
Mr. Justice Sutherland's theory of the nature of the foreign relations
power represents the most extreme interpretation of the powers of the
national government. It is the furthest departure from the theory that
United States is a constitutionally limited democracy. It introduces
the notion that national government possesses a secret reservoir of un-
accountable power. In terms of democratic theory this represents an
unfortunate departure from the long accepted and cherished notions
as to the nature of the American system. Though the doctrine that
this is a government of enumerated powers had already undergone
much interpretation and expansion so that the doctrine was in fact
little more than a fiction, the basic theory had remained generally
undisturbed. The courts and publicists had spoken of "sovereign
powers," 10 but the generally accepted view was that every exercise
of power by the national government had, in some way, to be traceable
to the constitution.1 2 Chief Justice Marshall's theory of "implied"
99. See Levitan, Recent Developzents in the Control of Foreign Rlations tnder thc Urited
Staes Court (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, in University of Chicago Library 1940),
esp. cc. II and III. See also, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920) and A_-akura v.
Seattle, 265 U. S. 332 (1924). For an even broader interpretation of the scope of the treaty-
making power, see Potter, Inhibitions Upon the Treay.Mahing Power of the United States
(1934) 28 Am. J. INT. L 456; Scott, Treaty-3ahing Under the Authority of the Urited States
(1934) 28 PROC. Am. Soc. INr. L. 2; both articles are of great interest, for though they
start with different hypotheses they arrive at very much the same conclusions. Profezor
Potter's major premise is that "international law is superior in authority to national con-
stitutional law," and the minor premise, that "the treaty-making power is possessed by the
national state by virtue of international, not national, law," it then follows that whatever
limitations the treaty-making power may be subject to are as a result of international law.
[For international law limitations, see Law of Treaties, Harvard Draft (1935) 29 11M. J. INrT L.
(Surp.) ]. Professor Scott starts with the view that the American States had the full author-
ity and they turned over that plenary power, which became theirs upon the severance of
ties with Great Britain, to the central government at the time of the ratification of the con-
stitution.
100. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 341 (1924).
101. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581 (1889); Insular Cases, 182 U. S. 244 (1901);
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212 (1890).
102. WXRIGH at 132; Quarles, The Federal Gorernment: As to Foreign Affairs, Are Its
Powers Inherent as Distinguishedfrom Delegated? (1944) 32 GEO. L. J. 375; Patterson, In re
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powers, Mr. Hamilton's and Justice Story's theory of "resultant"
powers, and the more recent interpretation of the "general welfare"
clause all had a constitutional foundation-they were deduced from,
and 'elied upon, constitutional grants for their basis, in however a
cabalistic fashion.' Mr. Justice Sutherland's pronouncement of the
existence of "extra-constitutional" powers-powers which can be
"pulled out of the hat" when there arises need for them-is contrary
to the predominant judicial interpretation and the accepted theoretical
assumptions of the nature of the American system of government.
That "there can be no question as to the constitutional unsoundness as
well as of the revolutionary character of the theory" of inherent sov-
ereign powers is unassailable.' Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion,
therefore, represents an erroneous-if not dangerous-constitutional
exposition.10
The ambiguities in the Curtiss-Wright opinion make it difficult to
determine which phrases most accurately represent the views of the
Court and to evaluate fully its practical significance. On the one hand,
it is stated that "the investment of the federal gbvernment with the
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative
grants of the Constitution." While, on the other hand, Mr. Justice
Sutherland exhorts that this "like every other governmental power,
must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution." In view of Mr. Justice Sutherland's earlier writings, it
is quite clear that he leaned towards the broader interpretation. But
that his brethren would have gone along with his "extra-constitutional"
theory is quite doubtful. One fact should not be overlooked-that the
arhbiguities of the opinion do not rule it out as available precedent.
As a matter of fact, it has already served as a welcome springboard for
decisions upholding much broader exercises of authority. It is this
availability as precedent that makes opinions such as this one doubly
unfortunate. Were one to assign binding effect to the more sweeping
statements on the scope of the external powers, then, it would appear
that treaty provisions even violative of substantive phrases of the Con-
stitution, i.e., the bill of rights, or the Fifth Amendment, would be
binding on the United States.' Such a question arose earlier in our
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (1944) 22 TEx. L. REV. 286, 445 at 297 and passiti;
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 89 (1907); Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9
at487 (C. C. D. Md., 1861); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
103. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (U. S. 1819); 1 HAMILTON, WORKS
(Lodge ed. 1885) 184; 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUION (1st ed. 1833) 124;
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall 457 (U. S. 1871). WRIGHT at 132; Patterson, supra note 102 at
297, 460 and passim.
104. WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d student's ed. 1935) 62.
105. , See Goebel, note 35 supra.
106. See Law of Treaties, supra note 99, art. 24; 5 HACKWORTH 153-64. Cowles traces
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history, in the case of In re Dillon.07 In that case, Secretary of State
Marcy stated that: "the Constitution is to prevail over a treaty where
the provisions of the one come in conflict with the other. It would be
difficult to find a reputable lawyer in this country who would not yield
a ready assent to this proposition." "3 This has been the accepted posi-
tion of the American courts and statesmen, though foreign states have
not always acquiesced to this view.10 While some of the language in
the Curtiss-Wright and Belmont cases is broad enough to support the
validity of such treaty provisions, the matter is of very little practical
significance.
Treaties are made by the President only with the advice and consent
of two-thirds of the Senate while purely executive agreements are
entered into solely by the President-an elected official, subject to
public control, impeachment, etc. For this reason the likelihood that
drastic international agreements will be entered by American officials
exists only hypothetically in the imagination.
One distinguished student of the development of legal institutions
sees more serious and gloomy implications in the Citrliss-Wright de-
cision:
'To one familiar with the panoply of procedural devices which
the English crown possessed in respect to its prerogative in foreign
affairs the learned Justice's manipulation of the political scientists'
classification of sovereignty and his averment that external sov-
ereignty passed from the Crown to the Union is fraught with future
consequence. It is so because the novel idea that external sover-
eignty passed from the King to the Union implies a transfer of the
common law powers connected therewith, especially since Mr. Jus-
tice Sutherland states that 'the powers of external sovereignty do
not depend upon affirmative grants of the Constitution.' " "0
Such pessimism seems unwarranted in the light of the Supreme
Court's power to overrule or distinguish this decision whenever it so
desires. Consequently, we return to the proposition that the only real
significance and error of the Curliss-Wright opinion is that it introduces
strange and undesirable strains in American constitutional theory.
the role of Fifth Amendment in treaty cases in W. B. CoiLEs, Trx-m.s ,zo Co..ST1TV-
TIoNAL LAw (1941).
107. 7 Fed. Cas. 710, No. 3914 (N. D. Cal. 1354); S MoonE at 167-3; VnzG r at S5-6.
103. Mr. Marcy to Mr. Mason, minister to France, Sept. 11, 1854, 15 MS Inst., France,
210 cited in S MooRB at 167.
109. WVarGHTat 16-18; 5 Moons at 166-71; 5 HAcWoRTnat 153-64; Leitan, E.xceuhir3
Agreeraents: A Study of the Executive in the Control of the Foreign Rations of the U fted
States (1940) 35 ILL. L. REV. 365, 380 and passim.
110. Goebel, supra note 35 at 572.
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CONCLUSION
It has been shown that Mr. Justice Sutherland's theory is that the
national government possesses the foreign relations authority as an
"inherited" power. Inherited from whom? Did the national govern-
ment inherit this power from the Crown via the Continental Congress,
or, via the states? Is the national government the direct successor-
the power never having resided with the states-to the external powers
of the Crown? Or did the external powers fall originally to the states
who in turn were deprived of, or gave up, these powers to the national
government at the time of the adoption of the Constitution? Assuming
that one accepts the latter interpretation of the sequence of successors
to the external powers-the question then arises as to the breadth of
this bequest. The overwhelming opinion is that the national govern-
ment was bequeathed in 1787 complete authority over external affairs.
No part of this power was reserved to the states in the process of draft-
ing the Constitution: the mere presence of states in our system does
not serve as a limitation on the scope of the external powers of the na-
tional government. To that extent the decision in the Curtiss-Wright
case is in harmony with' precedent and with generally accepted prin-
ciples of Constitutional interpretation.
Though there is this general agreement that the national govern-
ment does possess complete authority as to external affairs, there is
basic disagreement as to how this power accrued to the national gov-
ernment and as to the nature of the power-delegated, inherent, or
inherited. Mr. Justice Sutherland justifies this: (1) as an attribute of
sovereignty-an "inherent" power; and (2) on the ground that the
national government is the direct successor of the Crown "inherited"
power. In contrast, Mr. James Brown Scott, while accepting the propo-
sition that the national government has all-embracing authority as to
external affairs, traces that authority to the delegation of 1789 when
the plenary authority over foreign affairs devolved from the states to
the nation.
A review of the political and constitutional ideas prevailing in
America at the time of the Revolution and of the Constitutional Con-
vention leaves little room for the acceptance of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
"inherent" powers, or, in fact, "extra-constitutional" powers theory.
Rather it seems that "the theory upon which and the intent with
which our central government was ordained and established were that
. . . it was to be a government whose powers were not intrinsic but
granted . . ." I"
The disagreement as to the route of succession of the external powers
was reflected in our legal literature almost a century and a half ago in
111. Quarles, supra note 102 at 382.
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Penhallow v. Doane.11 2 Mr. Justice Iredell therein set forth what has
been described as the James Brown Scott thesis, 13 while Mr. Justice
Paterson expounded the theory subsequently espoused by Mr. Suther-
land." 4 It is essential that the reader bear in mind that the acceptances
of the Iredell-Scott thesis that the States delegated their foreign affairs
power does not necessitate a limiting interpretation of the treaty-
making power as a result of the ratification of the Constitution. Pro-
fessor Corwinhas clearly stated that this "theory" is logically adequate
if we assume that the states are today devoid of capacity to sustain
foreign relationships. Thus, unless it has dropped entirely out of exist-
ence, their former authority in foreign affairs must have passed to the
national government, and hence be as complete in the latter as by
hypothesis it originally was in the former. 13
Regarding the "inherent" powers doctrine, it is well to add, that
though the existence of such powers has sometimes been referred to by
the courts and by writers on public law, there is little justification for
the perpetuation of such a theory. Its introduction was contrary to the
spirit of a written constitution. Whether or not a written constitution
is the most desirable basis for a government, as long as we live under
such a document there appears little room for a theory of "inherent"
powers. Instead a liberal and broad interpretation of such provisions
of the Constitution as the general welfare clause is more in harmony
with our philosophy that the Constitution limits governmental au-
thority. The argument that the interpretation and reinterpretation of
constitutional phrases in the light of modern conditions makes little
more than a fiction out of the notion that we are living under the Con-
stitution, will not be denied. Our government should continue to
evolve to meet the ever-changing needs of the people w% ithin the frame-
work of the general philosophy of a supreme Constitution with some
specific prohibitions.' The Sutherland doctrine, however, makes
shambles out of the very idea of a constitutionally limited government.
It destroys even the symbol.
112. 3 Dall. 54 (U. S. 1795).
113. Id. at 91-95.
114. Id. at 80-81, though Mr. Justice Paterson does not go quite as far as Mr. Justice
Sutherland; Goebel, supra note 35 at 571, n. 46. See 1 FAIrrM.o, op. cit. supra note 85 at 323.
115. CORWIN, THE PRESmENrr: OFFICE AND POWERS (1940) 203.
116. For examples of the constitutional construction recommended in the tc-.t cae
Mr. Justice Cardozo dissenting in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 440 (1935);
Mr. Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 433-5 (19201
19461
